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DOES FACT-FINDING PROMOTE SETTLEMENT? 
THEORY AND A TEST 
David L. Dickinson and Lynn Hunnicutt 
ABSTRACT 
Some labor negotiations include a break in which a non-binding recommendation is made 
by a fact-finder as an intermediate dispute resolution procedure. There is some uncertainty, 
however, as to whether this fact-finding increases or reduces the likelihood of settlement. 
Inasmuch as fact-finding reduces uncertainty about the outcome, it may "chill" bargaining and 
increase the need for additional dispute resolution procedures. On the other hand, the 
fact-finder's recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which they are able to 
craft an agreement, thus reducing the incidence of disputes. Which of these effects dominates is 
a question that we consider using both a theoretical model and data from a controlled 
experimental bargaining environment. 
JEL Codes: C78, C92, J52 
JEL key words: bargaining, experiments, dispute resolution, arbitration 
DOES FACT-FINDING PROMOTE SETTLEMENT: 
THEORY AND A TEST* 
1. Introduction 
Dispute resolution is of interest in a variety of bargaining environments, from labor 
relations to insurance. Commonly used forms of dispute resolution include mediation and 
arbitration. While a mediator imposes no binding settlement, an arbitrator imposes a settlement 
that is typically binding and non-appealable. Fact-finding falls somewhere in between these two 
by allowing the fact-finder to issue a non-binding formal recommendation that may guide and/or 
pressure disputants as to what a mandated settlement might look like. For example, Hebdon 
(200 1) reports that a chief aim of the public policy change in New York state in 1991 was to 
"give more weight to the fact-finder recommendations" (p. 74). Here, we ask whether 
non-binding recommendations, such as those issued by fact-finders, significantly affect dispute 
rates and/or bargaining outcomes. We offer a simple theoretical extension from existing 
research as well as empirical data generated in a controlled laboratory bargaining environment to 
explore relevant issues. 1 
Farber and Katz (1979) study bargainer incentives under conventional arbitration and 
show that uncertainty about the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement is a key variable that 
increases the bargainers' contract zone (i.e., the region of outcomes mutually preferred to the 
disputants' reservation values or threat points) .2 To the extent that fact-finding decreases 
·Valuable comments were provided by David Aadland and participants at the International Atlantic Economic 
Conference in Paris, France, and the Utah Academy Annual Conference in Logan, Utah. This reserch was supported 
in part by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-4810. Michelle Crook 
provided helpful research assistance on this project. The authors also thank Kamalakar Thota, Jianlin Cheng, Lujun 
Zhang, Pablo F. Rego Barros, and especially Stacie Gomm for their work on the computerized bargaining 
application. 
'Ashenfelter et al. (1992) examine incentives under "tri-offer" arbitration, where an arbitrator is constrained to 
choose as a settlement either one of the disputant's fmal offers or the recommendation ofa fact-fmder. We examine 
a fundamentally different issue by considering arbitrators who place positive fixed weight on the fact-fmder 
recommendation in determining an otherwise unconstrained fmal settlement. Hebdon (2001) highlights that there 
are currently no theoretical models offact-fmding. 
2Conventional arbitration refers to the set of arbitration rules that allow the arbitrator to craft any settlement seen as 
appropriate. This is in contrast to what is referred to as fmal-offer arbitration, where the arbitrator is constrained to 
choose one of the disputants' fmal offers as the binding settlement. For an analysis of fmal offer arbitration, see 
Farber (1980). For an early article relating uncertainty to settlement rates, and for the development of the rules for 
fmal offer arbitration, see Stevens (1966). 
2 
uncertainty, their results suggest that fact-finding is counterproductive towards good-faith 
bargaining because decreased uncertainty also decreases the size of the contract zone.3 An 
alternative view of fact-finding is that the formal recommendation creates a focal point for the 
disputants, a settlement that suggests itself as a likely and reasonable outcome of the bargaining 
process, and therefore makes agreement more likely.4 Which of these effects may dominate is 
the key subject of this paper. 
We model fact-finding as an intermediate step in negotiations prior to conventional 
arbitration.5 Fact-finders issue an unbiased nonbinding recommendation for settlement. The 
final stage arbitrator forms his own notion of a fair settlement and crafts a final binding 
settlement as a (common knowledge) weighted average of his own notion and the fact-finder 
recommendation. This framework allows us to consider scenarios in which an arbitrator or final 
decision maker places little or much weight on the recommendation, and we model the effects of 
such weighting on the contract zone both before and after the fact-finder recommendation.6 
3Researchers are not unanimous in the belief that a larger contract zone makes negotiated settlements more likely 
(Crawford (1982), Farber and Bazerman (1987)). However, there is a fair amount of theoretical and empirical 
research showing that larger (smaller) contract zones generate more (less) efficient bargaining (e.g., Tracy (1986, 
1987), Crampton (1992), Ashenfelter et al (1992), Babcock et al (1995), and Farber, Neale and Bazerman (1990)). 
4There is a large literature on focal points in game theory. The seminal work for focal points in bargaining 
environments are Schelling (1957, 1960). For theoretical treatment of focal points (also known as salience) in 
coordination games, see Sugden (1995), Bacharach (1993), and Janssen (2001). 
5Given our particular framework, our results are not completely comparable with empirical results from statutes that 
settle public sector disputes with fact-fmding or arbitration (but would not use both should fact-finding fail) . 
6For example, the 1960's Taylor Law for public sector employees in New York State includes formal fact-fmding in 
dispute resolution, with the fact-fmder recommendation being presented at final resolution of the dispute should the 
recommendation itself not produce a settlement (see Pegnetter (1971)). Karper (1994) notes that public sector fact-
fmding includes examples in which the fact-fmder is influential and non-influential. McKelvey (1969) notes that 
fact fmding may be used to economize on legislators ' time (i.e., influential fact finding) . However, McKelvey also 
predicts that legislative bodies in New York would largely ignore recommendations as they grew in sophistication, 
and Karper (1994) finds evidence that this did occur in at least some government sectors (e.g., non-influential fact 
We find that, contrary to the uncertainty hypothesis of Farber and Katz (1979), fact-
finding reduces the likelihood of dispute. That is, our experimental subjects negotiate their own 
settlements more frequently when a fact-finding break is included than they do when dispute 
resolution is with binding arbitration but no fact-finding. This lends support to our focal point 
hypothesis - that the fact-finder's recommendation makes a particular outcome "salient" and 
gives the parties some basis for agreement. Additional support for the focal point hypothesis is 
found by examining "extreme" recommendations; our evidence suggests that even when a non-
influential fact-finder makes an extreme recommendation it is likely that negotiated settlement 
will be near the recommendation. 
We use the term "fact-finding" because it is a well-known form of dispute resolution that 
uses nonbinding recommendations as a key tool to pressure disputants towards settlement. 
However, our results have implications for any bargaining situation in which there is an 
intermediate-stage recommendation that can be given more or less weight by a final stage 
3 
binding decision-maker. An example from legal proceedings is the use of a Special Master 
appointed by a Judge, such as in the Microsoft anti-trust case.7 Also, criminal cases often include 
the recommendation of a probation officer in the sentencing phase, and a social worker report in 
a juvenile case is also likely to include recommended actions. 
2. Theory 
The model extends Farber and Katz (1979) to include two bargaining stages, with a 
break in bargaining for a fact-finding process. As in their model, we consider two parties A and 
fmding) . Hebdon (2001) reports general success of fact fmding in New York State through the 1990's. 
7This example was given to us by Caryn Beck-Dudley. 
4 
B bargaining over a fixed amount of money - the "pie" ($1 , say). Party A plays the role of the 
buyer or the firm in labor negotiations. Party B is the seller or the union in labor negotiations. 
Each player's utility depends on the fraction of the dollar she receives, as well as her risk 
preferences, parameterized by Ca and Cb. In particular 
U
B 
= 1- exp(ycb ) and U
A 
= 1- exp(zca ) 
1- expcb 1- exp ca 
where y is the amount player B receives, and z is the amount that player A receives. For both 
players these utility functions display positive marginal utilities with respect to the size of the pie, 
U(O)=O, U(1)=I, and risk preferences are defined solely by -Cj for i=a,b, the Arrow-Pratt measure 
of absolute risk aversion (see Farber and Katz (1979)). As such, player i is risk-averse (loving) 
when c j < (» 0. Notice that we may seey<l-z if the players agree on a non-Nash equilibrium 
division of the dollar. 8 
Bargaining proceeds as follows: each disputant is free to make any offer she likes to the 
other disputant at any time. Bargaining continues until agreement is reached or the disputants 
reach an impasse in the first stage of bargaining, at which point a fact finder makes a 
recommendation to the parties about a fair settlement. After some second interval, if the parties 
have not yet reached agreement, an arbitrator resolves the dispute by issuing a binding 
settlement. This binding settlement is modeled as a weighted average of the arbitrator's notion 
of a fair outcome and the fact-finder recommendation, and the weights are common knowledge. 
In particular, the arbitrator settles the dispute as follows: 
y=rR +(1-r)D (1) 
8Nash equilibrium requires that there be no money left on the table once bargaining is complete. Our experimental 
environment allows only Nash equilibrium division of the pie. 
5 
where Y is the amount the arbitrator awards to player B, R is the fact-finder's recommendation 
about what player B should receive, y is the weight the arbitrator puts on the fact-finder ' s 
recommendation, and D is the arbitrator's estimate of what a fair settlement for player B would 
be. We assume that D is a normally distributed random variable, with meanYd and variance (J'2. 
The players may have different beliefs about the arbitrator, however, so that player B (A) expects 
to receive Ybd (Zad) with variance (J'b2 (J'a2). Notice that the weight y ranges between zero and one. 
When y = 0, the fact-finder recommendation is completely ignored by the arbitrator, and ify = 1, 
all uncertainty about the game's arbitrated outcome is resolved once the fact-finder makes his 
recommendation. In this case, the fact-finder is equivalent to the arbitrator. The more interesting 
cases occur when y is strictly between zero and one, which is assumed from here on.9 
2.1 The Contract Zone After Fact-Finding 
There are two stages of bargaining: before the fact-finder makes his recommendation (ex 
ante) and after the fact-finder's recommendation is known but before the arbitrator ' s final 
decision (ex post). Straightforward calculations yield the following certainty equivalents (the 
least player B would accept to avoid arbitration, YbS' and the most player A would give up to 
avoid arbitration, YaS) 
1 2 2 Y bS = r R + (1- r) Y bd + - C b (1- r) (J b 
2 
1 2 2 
Y aS = r R + (1- r) Y ad - 2" C a (1- r) a a 
Notice that ex-post uncertainty is reduced by the fact-finder's recommendation, since 
both players know that yR makes up part of the arbitrated settlement. In fact , as y approaches 
one, uncertainty disappears once the fact-finder's recommendation is known. 
9 An interesting extension would make y a function of the fact-fmder recommendation. For example, y could be 
modeled as an increasing function of the reasonableness of the recommendation to the arbitrator-. 
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As before, YaS"# YbS is possible, since the parties may have different ideas about what the 
arbitrator's preferences are. For example, if both players are optimistic, then they expect to 
obtain more than the arbitrator is actually willing to give them. In this case, we would see 
Ybd > Y> Yad' which (depending on risk attitudes) could lead to YbS> Y> Yas' 
Equation (2) gives the ex post contract zone, ;1ffep . 
~ .fJep = YaS - YbS 
(2) 
There are two determinants of the contract zone: (1) the bargainers' beliefs about the 
arbitrator (given by Yad - Ybd, 2 and 2), and the bargainer's attitudes toward risk (given by Ca 
a a a b 
and cb ). Farber and Katz (1979) demonstrate the contract zone without a fact-finder (equivalent 
to y = 0) is given by 1 2 2 • The presence of a fact-finder, given risk-averse 
~ = Yad - Ybd --(cb ()b + Ca ()a) 2 
bargainers, makes the ex post contract zone smaller than the no fact-finder contract zone, as the 
effect of bargainer beliefs about the arbitrator and of risk aversion are reduced by 1 - Y and 
(1 - yf, respectively. This result is intuitive, since the fact-finder gives the parties some 
knowledge of what the arbitrator's decision will be. 
Furthermore, the more weight the arbitrator puts on the fact-finder's recommendation 
(i.e., the larger is y), the more the size of the contract zone is reduced after the fact-finder's 
recommendation. In particular, 
1 2 2 ~ - ~ ffep = r (Y ad - Y bd ) - "2 r (2 - r) ( C b () b + C a () a) • 
If the parties have the same beliefs about the arbitrator (i.e., Ybd=Yad and O'/=O'/=d) , we 
may write this difference as ;1-;1 ffep = - r (2- r) 0'2 (C
b 
+ Ca) / 2 ,which is positive (negative) as 
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the parties are jointly risk-averse (loving). That is, the presence of a fact-finder reduces the size 
of the ex post contract zone as long as the parties are jointly risk-averse (c
b 
+c
a 
<0). 
2.2 The Contract Zone Before Fact-Finding 
We next examine the ex ante contract zone, I1ffea, and see how it compares to I1fjep and 11. 
Suppose that (as Hebdon (2001) suggests) the fact-finder comes from the same pool of 
candidates as the arbitrator, but their decisions are independent. We may then assume that R (the 
fact-finder's recommendation) has the same mean and variance as D, that is Y d and a 2 for 
a a 
bargainer A, and Y bd and a; for player B. Straightforward calculation yields the following 
certainty equivalents: 
As before, we know that player A would be willing to give up YaS to avoid bargaining, so 
that the contract zone is given by YaS - YbS. Thus, we see that 
~ ffea = (Yad - Y bd ) - ~ ( C b a~ + C a a ~ ) (r 2 + (1 - r )2 ) 
By comparing the ex ante and ex post contract zones we find 
~ ffea - ~ ffep = r (Y ad - Y bd ) - ~ r 2 ( C b a ~ + C a a ~ ) 
(3) 
(4) 
which depends both on the parties' beliefs about the fact-finder (Yad - Ybd) and on their degree of 
risk aversion (cb, ca). Assuming identical beliefs about the distribution of fact-finder preferences 
(i.e.'Ybd=Yadand a/=a/=a1, equation (4) reduces to 
which is positive (negative) as the parties are jointly risk averse (loving). That is, the ex ante 
contract zone is larger (smaller) as the parties are jointly risk averse (loving). Assuming risk 
8 
aversion, as seems reasonable, we see that the added uncertainty makes the contract zone larger 
before the fact-finder recommendation than after. 
Comparing the ex ante contract zone with the no-fact -finder contract zone, we see that 
I'>. -I'>. If,a =~(r2 +(1-d -1)( cb 0'; +ca O'n 
=r(r-1)( cb 0"; +ca 0": ) 
Assuming identical beliefs about the arbitrator, 
L1 - L1 ffea = a 2 r (r - 1 ) ( C b + C a ) 
which is positive (negative) as the parties are jointly risk averse (risk loving). If parties are 
. jointly risk averse, fact-finding reduces the contract zone even before the recommendation. The 
recommendation (if it is reached) reduces the size of the contract zone even further. 
Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between L1, L1jJea, and L1jJep as functions of y for the 
identical expectations case assuming joint risk aversion (ca+cb<O). In addition to the relative 
sizes of the contract zones it is also the case that the ex ante contract zone is symmetric about 
y=1/2 with the least uncertainty, and hence the smallest contract zone, at y=1/2. IO It is actually 
quite intuitive that this is the case because the bargainers have the most diversified portfolio in 
terms of expected ex ante outcomes when y=1I2 , since neither the arbitrator nor the fact-finder 
draw is more heavily weighted. 
Figure 1 about here 
3. The Experimental Environment 
The experimental environment uses a computer interface to randomly and anonymously 
match subjects - disputant A (the buyer) and disputant B (the seller) - with a counterpart for 
I~ote that in the identical expectations case dL1 ffea / dr = (1- 2r )a 2 (cb + ca) , which is zero at y=1/2. 
9 
twenty 3-minute rounds, with subjects bargaining over the value of a variable, X.II Disputant A 
is given a payoff sheet that shows cash experimental earnings increasing as x decreases, whereas 
disputant B's payoffs increase in x. Each subject is aware that counterpart earnings move 
opposite hislher own earnings, but the subjects are unaware of the level of counterpart payoffs for 
different values ofx. Thus, subjects are aware that their own gain is their counterpart's loss, but 
payoff levels are private information to simulate the real world asymmetry that exists in assessing 
the value your bargaining counterpart places on the object of negotiations. Given this, our 
environment is one in which the exact size of the contract zone is uncertain. 12 The disputants 
bargain in each round over a $2.00 pie which (unknown to the disputants) would be equally spli~ 
at x=500. Each one-unit increase in x increases (disputant B) or decreases (disputant A) payoffs 
by one-half cent. 
Communication is not allowed during the experiment other than the numeric messages 
transmitted through the subjects' computer terminals. Disputants are free to exchange numeric 
offers any way they desire. There is no stipulation that offers must "improve" upon previous 
offers or wait for counteroffers. The standing (most recent) offer of either disputant is displayed 
at the top of the offer queue, and either disputant can accept his/her counterpart's standing offer. 
lIThe experimental environment is motivated by the design of Ashenfelter et al (1992), and is an extension of the 
bargaining-with-arbitration application used in Dickinson (2001) . 
12 Additionally, subjects may not make offers outside of their bargaining range. Disputant A is instructed to bargain 
for xE[200,700], and disputant B for xE[300,800]. The theoretical predictions are silent as to the effects of this 
detail, but it is meant to improve the validity of the data since real-world bargainers would likely not have full 
information on their counterpart's target range. Further, asymmetric ranges should help avoid a simple 50-50 split 
outcome (an issue mentioned in Ashenfelter et al. (1992), though they deal with it in a different way). 
10 
Subjects proceed at their own pace through on-screen instructions that explain in detail all 
aspects of the experimental bargaining environment. Sample bargaining screens are displayed to 
the subjects in the general instructions to highlight these important details. 
There are 4 distinct treatments (5 rounds of each) that the subjects face across their 20 
bargaining rounds. 13 In one treatment subjects are allowed to bargain for the entire 3-minute 
round and, should they reach the end of the round without agreeing on the size of x, payoffs to 
both disputants are zero. We call this treatment NA (no arbitration), and it serves as a useful 
benchmark for treatments in which arbitration and or fact-finding is utilized at impasse. 
In the CA (conventional arbitration) treatment without fact-finding, impasse is handled at 
the end of the bargaining round by making a draw from a N(500,60) distribution of potential 
arbitrator settlements (see Ashenfelter et al (1992) for a use and justification of the form of 
controlling the arbitrator decision-making process for experimental purposes). The draw 
determines the x-settlement and therefore the payoff of the disputants in that round. Subjects are 
given information in the CA specific instructions as to what likely settlements would be should 
they invoke the computerized arbitrator ("decision-maker" to the subjects). Specifically, subjects 
are shown a table of 100 numbers drawn from the arbitrator distribution. Additionally, the 
subjects are shown a graph of the arbitrator distribution along with summary statistics describing 
its central tendencies. While the table of 100 numbers provides subjects with data as they might 
gather them in the field, there is concern that the subjects might not process the data similarly 
(see Dickinson (2001), Babcock & Olson (1992), Farber & Bazerman (1987)). The additional 
13Subjects were unaware that 5 rounds of each treatment would be completed, which helps control for strategic play 
across multiple rounds. Also the specific ordering of the treatments varied for different bargaining pairs (although 
each treatment consisted of five consecutive rounds) - this was to control for potential ordering effects . 
graph and summary statistics are meant to increase the likelihood that subj ects have a common 
perception of the arbitrator settlement distribution as is assumed by the theory. 
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We also include two fact-finding treatments, which vary the amount of weight that the 
end-of-the-round arbitrator places on the fact-finder recommendation (referred to as the 
"computer suggestion" to the subjects). At the end of 1.5 minutes of the 3-minute bargaining 
round, the round is interrupted and subj ects are shown a recommendation from the computerized 
fact-finder. Subjects are aware that the suggestion is not binding but will be incorporated into an 
end-of-round final settlement should negotiations fail for the remainder of the round. Bargaining 
then resumes for the final 1.5 minutes of the round as usual. In one treatment, FF(20%), a 20% 
weight is placed on the recommendation and an 80% on the computer's own draw from the 
arbitrator settlement distribution. The final treatment, FF(80%), proceeds similarly except with 
an 80% weight on the fact-finding recommendation and a 20% weight on the computerized 
arbitrator. The process is explained thoroughly and with numeric examples in the on-screen 
instructions prior to a set of fact-finder treatment rounds, and the weight to be placed on any fact-
finder recommendation should negotiations fail is common knowledge prior to negotiations. 
It should be noted that while real-world negotiations are usually face-to-face, we have 
described anonymous, no-communication experiments. Our reasoning is that face-to-face 
communication would imply a loss of control over the bargaining environment. 
" ... [U]ncontrolled aspects of social interaction" (Roth (1995)) are a concern in such face-to-face 
negotiations as they cannot be as easily quantified as other demographic variables. As such, we 
have chosen to remove these potentially confounding factors from the experimental 
12 
environment. I4 The external validity of experimental data may also be a concern. There is, 
however, some support for the use of simple lab negotiation data towards a broader purpose of 
understanding naturally-occurring bargaining environments (see Bolton and Katok (1998) and 
Roth et al. (1988), e.g.) when such experiments involve economically motivated subjects. 
3.1 Testable Hypothesis in the Experimental Environment 
Farber and Katz (1979) suggest that reduced uncertainty makes sincere bargaining more 
difficult and would likely increase dispute rates. I5 Since the fact-finder reduces uncertainty about 
the arbitrated outcome, negotiated settlements should occur less frequently after the fact-finder's 
recommendation is known than before. Additionally, since the presence of a fact-finder reduces 
even the size of the ex ante contract zone, negotiated settlements should be less frequent when 
conventional arbitration includes a fact-finding break than when it does not. These two 
predictions suggest that the proportion of negotiated outcomes should be smaller for rounds 
which include a fact-finding break, and that where a fact-finding break is included most 
agreements should occur before the fact-finder recommendation. In effect, fact-finding reduces 
the likelihood of settlement. 
On the other hand, the literature on focal points (see especially Schelling (1957)) suggests 
that the recommendation gives the parties a point of reference in coordinating their actions, and 
that negotiated outcomes should be near the recommendation, if one is received. While focal 
I4Repeated bargaining with the same individual implies that we have created a dynamic experiment to test a static 
theory. Experimental economists frequently use repetition of the environment to improve the chances of generating 
high quality experimental data, as subjects may require some learning of the environment, with the understanding 
that the data analysis must correct for potential non-independence of outcomes across rounds. 
I5Some might argue that a high weight on the fact-finder recommendation "forces" agreement (Crawford, 1979). 
This implies that instead of "chilling" bargaining, a smaller contract zone "warms" it, and we would expect to see 
more voluntary settlements the higher the weight on the fact-finder recommendation. As we will see, the data do 
not support this hypothesis. 
13 
points may exist prior to the recommendation, our claim is that the recommended outcome is 
more salient than other (possibly pre-existing) focal points. If the recommendation does indeed 
enhance salience, then we expect to see a higher settlement rate under fact-finding treatments 
than under those that end in conventional arbitration without fact-finding. 
The parameters for the three treatments involving arbitration (FF(20%), FF(80%), and 
CA) are highlighted in Figure 1. The level of detail in subject instructions about the fact-finder 
distribution of recommendations (and arbitration settlement distribution) are meant to create the 
identical expectations that we assume in Figure 1. This provides us with the following testable 
hypotheses. Both of these hypotheses are based on the assumption of joint risk-aversion. 16 
Hypothesis 1 (Uncertainty): Disputes will occur more frequently with fact-finding than 
without it (i.e., "chilled" negotiations). Bargaining is most 
chilled after the fact-finding recommendation is issued, so 
that within the fact-finding treatments, most agreements 
will be reached before the recommendation. 
Hypothesis 2 (Focal Point): The issuance of a non-binding recommendation, creates a 
salient outcome for bargaining, thus decreasing the 
likeli~ood of dispute, and increasing the likelihood of 
settlement near the recommendation, independent of the 
weight the recommendation receives. 
As is apparent in Figure 1, the uncertainty hypothesis is a statement reflecting the size of 
the contract zone, since the hypothesis is based on the result that lesser uncertainty reduces the 
size of the contract zone (and hence decreases the likelihood of settlement). The focal point 
hypothesis notes the value of fact-finding in making the recommendation salient, in which case 
16We consider joint risk aversion a reasonable assumption in general. While we elicit risk preference data from our 
experimental subjects that support the assumption of risk aversion (i.e. , subjects responding to an end-of-the-
experiment hypothetical question were indifferent, on average, between $10 with certainty and a 50-50 gamble over 
$0 and $30), this question created considerable confusion among the subjects and is omitted from the data analysis. 
However, Holt and Laury (2002) fmd that subjects responding to non-hypothetical lottery questions are typically 
risk averse, even over "normal" laboratory payoffs. 
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agreement is more likely independent of the weight the arbitrator places on the recommendation. 
If dispute rates are less likely under fact-finding but depend on the weight placed on the 
recommendation or occur most often before the fact-finder recommendation, then this would be 
evidence that both the size of the contract zone and the presence of a focal point are important. 
4. Results 
We report results from 104 university student subjects who participated in this 20-round 
experimental bargaining environment. Total observation at the bargaining pair level are N=1 038 
(52 pairs at 20 rounds each minus two rounds of data removed due to computer file errors during 
the experiment). The experiments lasted an average of about 1 hour and 20 minutes, with subject 
earnings averaging $19.17 (a high of$30.75 and a low of$7.50). Monetary incentives were 
therefore quite significant relative to the opportunity cost of most students' time. 
Summary statistics from the experiments are shown in Table 1. Our sample is fairly well 
divided between male and female subjects. Dispute rates can be seen to vary substantially by 
dispute resolution mechanism, and disputes are least likely when subjects earn nothing if they fail 
to agree. Among the procedures ending in binding arbitration, disputes are least likely under 
fact-finding and most likely under conventional arbitration with no fact-finding. This lends 
support to the focal point hypothesis outlined in the previous section. Interestingly, the gender 
composition of the bargaining pairs appears to affect dispute rates in the fact-finding treatments. 
While we have no a priori hypothesis as to why males and females respond distinctly to a 
recommendation, we explore the possibility of gender effects in our statistical analysis below. 
To further examine the focal point hypothesis, we examine only the subsample of rounds 
in which the parties received a recommendation and subsequently agreed, and look to see how far 
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the agreed-upon value ofx was from the recommendation. If the fact-finder recommendation is a 
focal point of bargaining, then we expect that most agreements will occur at or near the 
recommendation. Figures 2 and 3 show the distance between the negotiated outcome and the 
fact-finder recommendation for the )'=0.2 and )'=0.8 fact finder treatments. It is clear that a large 
proportion of agreements occur within one standard deviation of the fact-finder's 
recommendation. In fact, for )'=0.2,69% all agreements (106 out of 154 observations) are within 
60 points of the fact-finder's recommendation. Fory=0.8, 64% of all agreements (76 out of 118 
observations) are within 60 points of the fact-finder's recommendation. 
This support for the focal point hypothesis could be refuted by noting that most of these 
agreements occurred before the recommendation was given (see discussion below) and were 
close to the center of the range of possible negotiated outcomes. Since we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the middle of the agreement range or the expected recommendation and arbitrator 
decision are focal points, especially before the recommendation is made, our first figures offer 
only limited support of our focal point hypothesis. 
To further test the focal point hypothesis, we examine agreements made after an 
unusually small (or large) recommendation. Specifically, we examine the proximity of 
negotiated settlements to fact-finder recommendations that are at least 60 points (one standard 
deviation) away from the expected arbitrator decision. Figures 4 and 5 present these results for 
)'=0.2 and )'=0.8 respectively. Not surprisingly, when the recommendation is unusually high (or 
low), agreements tended to be further away from the recommendation. That said, it is interesting 
to note that when )'=0.8, over half of all agreements (22 of 42 observations) are less than 60 
points from these extreme recommendations (see figure 5). Notice that these agreements cannot 
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equal the expected arbitration decision (500), which is at least 60 points away. When y=0.2, just 
over one-third (18 of 48 observations) of agreements are less than 60 points from extreme fact-
finder recommendations. As the focal point hypothesis suggests, extreme recommendations 
appear to pull negotiated settlements towards the recommendation, even when the fact-finder is 
known to be non-influential. 
Table 2 presents the results of a random effects pro bit estimation of treatment and pair-
specific variables on a dummy variable indicating whether a pair disputed (i.e., did not settle 
voluntarily) or not. The random effects estimation controls for the pair-specific heterogeneity in 
the dispute propensity of our sample by assuming that the pair-specific constant terms in the 
regression equation are randomly distributed across all bargaining pairs. That is, we assume that 
our sampled pairs were drawn from a large population of bargaining pairs. The results in Table 2 
show three distinct estimations: the first column is a treatment effects only estimation, the second 
column includes gender composition variables that are interacted with the treatment, and the 
third column includes additional pair-specific and descriptive variables as regressors. None of 
these additional variables are statistically significant and so their results are omitted for space 
considerations. 17 The marginal effects of the variables and their p-values are reported in Table 2. 
From Table 2 we highlight the following results. First, the probability of dispute 
increases by 25 percentage points under conventional arbitration (CA) versus destruction of the 
pie in the NA treatment. The use of a nonbinding suggestion in the fact-finding treatments 
increases the probability of disputes by a lesser amount than in the CA treatments. This is 
17Pull results are available from the authors upon request. The extra variables in the estimation of column 3 of 
Table 2 are descriptors of the pair ' s gender composition (not interacted with treatment variables) college major 
composition, religious composition, employment status, history of trial or arbitration experience, history of union 
affiliation, round of the experiment, and cumulative rounds of dispute within the experiment. 
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evidence in support of the focal point hypothesis 2. The fact that FF(80%) increases the 
likelihood of dispute relative to FF(20%) is evidence in favor of the uncertainty hypothesis since 
disputes are more likely when the ex post contract zone is smallest. 18 These results suggest that 
while reduced uncertainty may chill negotiations (compare FF(80%) to FF(20%)), the focal point 
value of a nonbinding suggestion outweighs this effect (compare CA to both FF treatments).19 
When gender interaction variables are included (column 2) we find some suggestive 
results of how gender composition may influence how effective nonbinding suggestion are in 
resolving disputes. Specifically, females in the bargaining pair seem to react favorably to 
nonbinding suggestions that are heavily weighted. We see this by noting that when the 
bargaining pair includes one or two females, the fact-finder recommendation decreases the 
probability of dispute by 15 and 25 percentage points, respectively, relative to an all male 
bargaining pair under FF(80%). This is a noteworthy result, as it says that dispute rates fall to 
close to that of no arbitration when the bargaining pair is all female and the fact-finder 
recommendation is heavily weighted. Such a result is likely due to innate gender differences in 
bargaining, since gender is anonymous in the experimental design. Column 3 includes the 
addition of pair-specific variables that are all insignificant determinants of the probability of 
dispute. In all cases, the pro bit models correctly predict just over 70% of the actual outcomes. 
We can summarize the comparison between arbitration with and without fact-finding by 
saying that a fact-finding stage appears to lessen the likelihood of dispute relative to arbitration 
18While it is true that FF(80%) increases the likelihood of disputes by more than does FF(20%), the difference may 
not be precisely measured. A Wald test on the restriction of the coefficient ofFF(80%) equaling the coefficient on 
FF(20%) fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality (p=.17) 
19The uncertainty results are consistent with previous studies (e.g. , Ashenfelter et al. (1992), Babcock and Taylor 
(1996» that show lower dispute rates when the variance of arbitrator draws is higher (i.e. , larger contract zone). 
with no fact-finding, and this effect is more pronounced with female disputants. This implies 
that focal points are important. However, the comparison between the two fact-finding 
treatments and our analysis of pre- and post-recommendation settlement rates implies that the 
size of the contract zone is also likely an important determinant of dispute rates, though to a 
lesser extent than the recommendation focal point. 
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While not a part of our formal model, timing of settlements appears in many others in the 
literature (Crampton (1992), Roth et al (1988)). We can examine the subset of fact-finder rounds 
to see if most agreements occurred before or after the recommendation in our data. Our results 
appear at the bottom of Table 1 and in Figure 6. Of the 520 total FF(80%) rounds, agreement 
occurred most often before the recommendation was issued (n=230). In fact, if the parties went 
beyond the recommendation, they were less likely to agree (n=118) than to disagree (n=172). 
The parties remained most likely to agree before the recommendation in FF(20%) (n=21 0). 
However, they were marginally more likely to agree after the recommendation (n=158) than to 
disagree (n=150). These results are consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis. When most of 
the uncertainty regarding the arbitrator's decision is resolved (y=0.8), disputants have little 
incentive to agree, and more frequently wait for the arbitrator's decision. If the recommendation 
resolves little of the uncertainty regarding the arbitrator's decision (y=0.2), incentives to sincerely 
bargain are higher and parties are more likely to agree than to invoke arbitration. 
We can further examine the timing of settlements by focusing on Figure 6, which shows 
the cumulative settlement frequencies, separated by treatment, for negotiated (not arbitrated) 
settlements. We measure the time of settlement within the 3-minute round on the horizontal axis 
and note the point at which a recommendation is issued in the fact-finding treatments. From 
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Figure 6 we can see that there are significant deadline effects in negotiations (see Roth et al. 
(1988)) as is evidenced by the upward spikes in the cumulative settlement distributions at the end 
of the 3-minute bargaining round. The issuance of a fact-finding recommendation in two of the 
treatments creates an additional deadline effect just prior to the recommendation. Overall, we 
see that negotiations are "chilled" until an 11 th hour settlement most significantly in NA, and the 
earliest settlements are most likely under CA. 
When a fact-finder recommendation is used, a more heavily weighted recommendation 
induces quicker settlements. While quickest settlements are most likely under CA, in the later 
stages of bargaining, but prior to the deadline effect, the heavily weighted fact-finder induces the 
highest percentage of negotiated settlements. However, we cannot conclude that the size of the 
contract zone drives the timing of negotiated settlements, since our model is silent with respect to 
precise settlement timing (see Figure 1). We should also note that while the pattern of settlement 
frequencies in Figure 6 is suggestive of significant treatment effects, the only significant 
differences are between NA and the other dispute resolution mechanisms.20 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the role that nonbinding suggestions play in 
dispute resolution. We show that the presence of a fact-finder as an intermediate step before 
binding arbitration decreases the uncertainty of a potential arbitrated settlement and therefore 
decreases the size of the contract zone. While Farber and Katz (1979) suggest that reduced 
20Results from a Kolmogorov-Smimov nonparametric full distribution test fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
distributions of CA, FF(20%), and FF(80%) are significantly distinct from one another. This test assumes that the 
distributions are mutually independent, which may not be the case, but the results are consistent with the estimation 
results of a bi-variate probit equation which looks at the probability of settling the dispute early versus late 
contingent upon not disputing. None of the marginal effects estimates of the treatment effects on the probability of 
early settlement were statistically significant. Results of this estimation are available upon request. 
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uncertainty (as would be created by a fact-finding process) chills negotiations and is 
counterproductive to voluntarily negotiated settlements, Schelling (1957) suggests that the 
creation of a significant focal point for negotiations would do just the opposite. Whether or not 
fact-finding increases voluntary settlement rates is tantamount to asking whether the creation of a 
focal point or the chilling of bargaining due to reduced of uncertainty will dominate. To examine 
this question, we generate data from a controlled laboratory experiment. 
Our main result shows that fact-finding increases the rate of negotiated settlements 
relative to the use of binding arbitration without fact-finding. Though there is some evidence 
that placing more weight on the recommendation may chill negotiations (i.e., the uncertainty 
hypothesis), this effect appears to be dominated by the significance of non-binding 
recommendations as a focal point for bargaining. This is an important result that applies whether 
the final stage decision-maker is an arbitrator, a state legislative body or a court of law, and the 
result also has implications beyond formal fact-finding. Specifically, any bargaining 
environment including a nonbinding suggestion prior to a mandated outcome is likely to promote 
more voluntary settlements. In some sense, this is evidence in support of mediation as a dispute 
resolution step prior to arbitration, though our results suggest that a formal recommendation -
typically not the domain of a mediator - is the important ingredient leading to settlement. 
We also find that the disputants' gender may be an important determinant in identifying 
the potential success of nonbinding recommendations. Female disputants were even more likely 
to achieve a voluntary settlement under fact-finding than were all-male pairs. Also, though a 
more heavily weighted fact-finder recommendation, on average, was less effective in reducing 
disputes than a less heavily weighted recommendation, the opposite was the case with female 
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disputants. Such a result suggests that a useful avenue for further research may be the 
investigation of whether there are systematic gender differences in how disputants respond to the 
size of the bargaining contract zone. 
As arbitration continues to be viewed as a viable alternative to litigation, these results 
suggest that an intermediate step that includes a recommended settlement is likely to be effective 
in increasing voluntary settlement rates. Though outcome uncertainty still appears to be a 
necessary ingredient in promoting good-faith or sincere negotiations, the value of a focal point 
for negotiations is evident in our results. Voluntary settlements are usually considered preferred 
to mandated settlements, and so the generation of credible focal points may be as useful way to 
improve any existing method of alternative dispute resolution. 
REFERENCES 
Ashenfelter, arley, Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, and Matthew Spiegel "An experimental 
comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems." Econometrica, 1992, 
60(6), pp. 1407-1433. 
Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, and Xianghong Wang "The relationship between 
uncertainty, the contract zone, and efficiency in a bargaining experiment." Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 1995,27, pp. 475-485. 
Babcock, Linda, and Lowell 1. Taylor "The role of arbitrator uncertainty in negotiation 
impasses." Industrial Relations, 1996, 35(4): 604-10. 
Babcock, Linda, and Craig A. Olson, "The causes of impasses in labor disputes" Industrial 
Relations, 1992, 31 (2): 348-360. 
Bacharach, Michael "Variable Universe Games" in K. Binmore, A. Kirman and P. Tani (eds) 
Frontiers of Game Theory, 1993 Cambridge: MIT Press. 
22 
Bolton, Gary E. and Elena Katok "Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental 
study of learning in repeated bargaining." Games and Economic Behavior, 1998,25:1-33. 
Crampton, Peter "Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty." Review of 
Economic Studies, 1992, 59, pp. 205-225. 
Crawford, Vincent "On compulsory arbitration schemes." Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 
87, pp. 131-160. 
--------- "A theory of disagreement in bargaining." Econometrica, 1982, 50(3): 607-637. 
Dickinson, David L. "A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Offer, and 'Combined' Arbitration 
for Dispute Resolution." 2001, Utah State University ERI working paper #2001-04. 
Farber, Henry S. "An analysis of final-offer arbitration." The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
December 1980, 24(4), pp. 683-705. 
-------- and Max H. Bazerman, "Why is there disagreement in bargaining?" American Economic 
Review, 198777(2):347-352. 
-------- and Harry C. Katz "Interest arbitration, outcomes, and the incentive to bargain." 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1979,33(1), pp. 55-63. 
-------- , Margaret A. Neale, and Max H. Bazerman "The role of arbitration costs and risk 
aversion in dispute outcomes." Industrial Relations, 1990,29(3):361-384. 
Hebdon, Robert "Fact-Finding effectiveness: Evidence from New York state." Industrial 
Relations, 2001, 40(1).73-82. 
23 
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. "Risk aversion and incentive effects." Discussion paper, 
2001 University of Virginia. 
Janssen, Maarten C. "Rationalizing Focal Points" Theory and Decision, 2001, 50:119-148. 
Karper, Mark D. "Fact Finding in public employment: Promise of illusion, revisited." Journal 
o/Collective Negotiations, 1994,23(4), p. 287-297. 
McKelvey, Jean "Fact Finding in public employment: Promise or illusion." Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 1969,22(4), p. 528-543. 
Pegnetter, Richard "Fact Finding and teacher salary disputes: The 1969 experience in New York 
State" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1971,24(2), p. 226-242. 
Roth, Alvin E., and J. Keith Mumighan, and Francoise Schoumaker "The Deadline Effect in 
Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 1988,78(4): 
806-823. 
Roth, Alvin E. "Bargaining experiments." in Kage, J.H. and A. Roth (eds) The Handbook 0/ 
Experimental Economics Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Schelling, Thomas C. "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War" Journalo/Conflict 
Resolution, 1957, 1:19-36. 
-------- The Strategy o/Conflict Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1960. 
Stevens, Carl M.. "Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?" Industrial 
Relations, 1966, 19(5): 38-52. 
Sugden, Robert "A Theory of Focal Points" The Economic Journal, 1995, 105(430):5343-550. 
Tracy, Joseph "An investigation into the determinants of U.S. strike activity." American 
Economic Review, 1986,76, pp. 423-436. 
-------- "An empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes." Journal 0/ Labor 
Economics, 1987,5, p. 149-173. 
24 
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Participants % Male=55 Female=45 
NA CA FF(20% ) FF(80 % ) 
Dispute Rates 16% 40% 29% 33% 
Negotiated X values 489.0 504.3 497.7 484.5 
(standard deviation) (96.2) (128.8) (97.3) (98.6) 
Dispute Rates by pair 1 female 1 female 
composition 2 males (buyer) (seller) 2 females 
NA 14.1 12.3 20.0 18.3 
CA 41.2 29.2 46.0 46.7 
FF(20 % ) 35.7 27.7 30.0 20.0 
FF(80% ) 45.9 24.6 36.0 21.7 
Agreement Agreement Agreement 
Frequency No before after 
(FF treatments) Agreement Recommend Recommend 
'F0.8 (520 obs) 172 230 118 
,,(=0.2 (518 obs) 150 210 158 
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TABLE 2 
Random effects probit estimation of dispute rates 
(dependent variable Dispute=l,O) 
Independent variable column 1 column 2 column 3 
marginal effects marginal effects marginal effects 
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Constant Term -.339 (.00)*** -.339 (.00)*** -.376 (.29) 
CA .254 (.00)*** .270 (.00)*** .329 (.00)*** 
FF(20%) .151 (.00)*** .226 (.00)*** .286 (.00)*** 
FF(80%) .189 (.00)*** .311 (.00)*** .342 (.00)*** 
1 female*CA --- -.049 (.47) -.062 (.57) 
2 females*CA --- .025 (.81) -.018 (.93) 
1 female*FF(20%) --- -.080 (.32) -.104 (.38) 
2 females*FF(20%) --- -.180(.11) -.199 (.22) 
1 female*FF(80%) --- -.154 (.02)* * -.165 (.10)* 
2 females*FF(80%) --- -.250 (.01)* * -.288 (.13) 
Additional explanatory --- --- all insignificant 
variables 
0/0 correctly predicted 70.40/0 70.40/0 72.10/0 
Chi -squared 83.7 (.00)*** 8l.3 (.00)* * * 9.81 (.00)*** 
log-likelihood -567.39 -560.27 -552.28 
***, **, * indicate significance at the p=.Ol, p=.05, and p=.10 level, respectively 
FIGURE 1 
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Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test 
ABSTRACT 
Some labor negotiations include a break in which a non-binding recommendation is made by a 
fact-finder as an intermediate dispute resolution procedure. There is some uncertainty, however, 
as to whether this fact finding increases or reduces the likelihood of settlement. Inasmuch as 
fact-finding reduces uncertainty about the outcome, it may "chill" bargaining and increase the 
need for additional dispute resolution procedures. On the other hand, the fact-finder's 
recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which they are able to craft an 
agreement, thus reducing the incidence of disputes. Which of these effects dominates is a 
question that we consider using both a theoretical model and data from a controlled experimental 
bargaining environment. 
JEL Key Words: Bargaining, Experiments, Dispute Resolution, Arbitration 
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1. Introduction 
Dispute resolution is of interest in a variety of bargaining environments, from labor 
relations to insurance. Commonly used forms of dispute resolution include mediation and 
arbitration. While a mediator imposes no binding settlement, an arbitrator imposes a settlement 
that is typically binding and non-appealable. Fact-finding falls somewhere in between these two 
by allowing the fact-finder to issue a non-binding formal recommendation that may guide and/or 
pressure disputants as to what a mandated settlement might look like. For example, Hebdon 
(2001) reports that a chief aim of the public policy change in New York state in 1991 was to 
"give more weight to the fact-finder recommendations" (p.74). Here, we ask whether nonbinding 
recommendations, such as those issued by fact-finders, significantly affect dispute rates and/or 
bargaining outcomes. We offer a simple theoretical extension from existing research as well as 
empirical data generated in a controlled laboratory bargaining environment to explore relevant 
issues.! 
Farber and Katz (1979) study bargainer incentives under conventional arbitration and 
show that uncertainty about the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement is a key variable that 
increases the bargainers' contract zone (i.e., the region of outcomes mutually preferred to the 
disputants' reservation values or threat points).2 To the extent that fact-finding decreases 
! Ashenfelter et al (1992) examine incentives under "tri-offer" arbitration, where an arbitrator is constrained to 
choose as a settlement either one of the disputant's final offers or the recommendation of a fact-finder. We examine 
a fundamentally different issue by considering arbitrators who place positive fixed weight on the fact-finder 
recommendation in determining an otherwise unconstrained final settlement. Hebdon (2001) highlights that there 
are currently no theoretical models of fact-finding. 
2Conventional arbitration refers to the set of arbitration rules that allow the arbitrator to craft any settlement seen as 
appropriate. This is in contrast to what is referred to as fmal-offer arbitration, where the arbitrator is constrained to 
choose one of the disputants' fmal offers as the binding settlement. For an analysis of final offer arbitration, see 
Farber (1980). For an early article relating uncertainty to settlement rates, and for the development of the rules for 
2 
